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Abstract
Naive Bayes spam filters are highly susceptible to data poisoning at-
tacks. Here, known spam sources/blacklisted IPs exploit the fact that their
received emails will be treated as (ground truth) labeled spam examples,
and used for classifier training (or re-training). The attacking source thus
generates emails that will skew the spam model, potentially resulting in
great degradation in classifier accuracy. Such attacks are successful mainly
because of the poor representation power of the naive Bayes (NB) model,
with only a single (component) density to represent spam (plus a possible
attack). We propose a defense based on the use of a mixture of NB mod-
els. We demonstrate that the learned mixture almost completely isolates
the attack in a second NB component, with the original spam component
essentially unchanged by the attack. Our approach addresses both the sce-
nario where the classifier is being re-trained in light of new data and, sig-
nificantly, the more challenging scenario where the attack is embedded in
the original spam training set. Even for weak attack strengths, BIC-based
model order selection chooses a two-component solution, which invokes the
mixture-based defense. Promising results are presented on the TREC 2005
spam corpus.
1 Introduction
Interest in adversarial learning has grown dramatically in recent years, with some
works focused on devising attacks against machine learning systems, e.g., [1, 2],
∗This research is supported in part by an AFOSR DDDAS grant and a Cisco Systems URP
gift.
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and others devising defenses, e.g., [3, 4, 11]. In this work, we address data poi-
soning attacks on generative classifiers, with particular focus on naive Bayes spam
filters. Recent reviews of spam filtering are [5, 6, 7]; see also [13, 14]. In data poi-
soning against spam filtering, the attacker, using an IP address known to produce
spam, generates emails that will be ground-truth labeled as spam but which are
more representative of ham. If these emails, and in sufficient quantity, are added
to the spam training set, they will grossly alter the word distribution under the
spam model, with concomitant degradation in accuracy of the spam filter [8].
Defenses against data poisoning attacks on various systems include [10] and
works described in [20]. For spam filtering, a “data sanitization” strategy was pro-
posed [9], which rejects putative additional training samples if trial-adaptation of
the spam model based on use of these samples causes degradation in classification
accuracy on a held-out validation set. This strategy makes two assumptions: i)
that there is sufficient labeled data to have a held-out validation set; ii) it assumes
the classifier has already been trained on “clean” data, with the attack consist-
ing of additional labeled samples for classifier retraining. [9] is not a practical
strategy when the attack is embedded within the original training set (with the
attack samples an unknown subset) — in such a case, a strategy such as [9] would
entail an enormous combinatoric space of {clean spam subset, attack data subset}
hypotheses to explore.
A potential strategy for designing a system robust to an embedded data poi-
soning attack is to identify the attack samples as training set outliers. While
such ideas are mentioned in [8] and are related to [15], we are not aware such ideas
have been practically, effectively applied to spam filtering. The reason naive Bayes
spam filters are so susceptible to data poisoning attacks is because, under each
class hypothesis (ham or spam) there is only a single model, whose training/model
estimation is degraded, in an unimpeded fashion, by the attacker. We propose a
model and learning mechanism that effects isolation of the attack samples, so that
they have little effect on estimation of the learned spam word model. Instead of
modeling spam using a single NB word distribution, we propose a mixture of NB
models for spam. We couple this mixture model with both i) a careful compo-
nent initialization strategy, so that the second component captures and isolates
the attack and ii) BIC-based model selection, which determines whether a second
mixture component is warranted (and hence whether the defense is invoked). Ex-
perimentally, whenever the attack strength is sufficient to induce even the mildest
degradation in classification accuracy, BIC selects a two-component model, which
invokes the defense and its attack mitigation. Moreover, most importantly, we
emphasize that our defense addresses both the scenarios where the attack is on
classifier retraining and when the attack is on the initial training. The latter is
the more challenging scenario.
2
2 A Mixture-based Defense Against Poisoning
of Spam Filters
2.1 Notation
We consider a dictionary of N unique words (following standard stemming and
stoplisting), with a given email represented as a vector of word counts x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xN), xl the number of times word l from the dictionary occurs in the
given email. Thus, emails are represented by fixed high-dimensional (but highly
sparse) vectors. Let Xh = {xhi , i = 1, . . . , Th} be a given training set of ham emails,
used to build a NB ham model. Likewise, let Xs = {xsi , i = 1, . . . , Ts} be a training
set of spam emails for building a NB spam model.
2.2 Attack Scenarios
We consider two attack scenarios: i) classifier retraining and ii) classifier training,
which is more challenging, and for which our method is the first successful defense
of which we are aware. In the first (retraining) scenario, one can initially build
clean ham and spam models (those uncorrupted by attack) using Xh and Xs,
respectively1. Let us denote a batch of additional samples that are treated as
labeled spam by X˜s = {x˜i, i = 1, . . . , T˜s}. In the retraining case, the learner
pools X˜s with Xs, retraining the spam model using the combined data pool Xsc =
{Xs, X˜s}. Note that X˜s may consist of legitimate spam samples, attack samples,
or some combination of the two. If one can utilize a separate, uncorrupted, held-
out validation set, the approach in [9] can effectively mitigate an attacking X˜s.
However, consider the other scenario – the training scenario. Unlike retraining,
where the subset X˜s is known to the learner, in the training scenario the attack
samples are embedded amongst the clean spam samples. The learner does not
know whether an attack is present and if so, which is the attack sample subset.
Again the learner uses Xsc, but in this case to perform the inaugural learning of the
spam model, not model retraining. In the sequel, we develop a common mixture-
based defense strategy, which effectively defeats the attack in both scenarios.
2.3 Two-component Mixture Model for Spam
The standard NB spam classifier computes the maximum a posteriori (MAP) deci-
sion, given an email’s vector x, as cˆMAP(x) = argmaxcP [C = c|x] = argmaxc log(αc)+
N∑
i=1
xi log(P [xi|c]), where c ∈ {h, s}, αs + αh = 1, and P [xi|c] is the probability of
count xi for word i under (a multinomial model for) class c, i.e. there is a single
NB component model for each class. We will invoke a BIC-based hypothesis test-
ing strategy [16] to decide, given Xsc, whether to use a single or a two-component
1Note that maximum likelihood estimation or Bayesian variants are easily performed, using
normalized frequency count estimates (over the labeled corpus) for each word, conditioned on
the class.
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model for spam2. The two-component spam model is
PM [x|s] = β1
N∏
i=1
P [xi|C = s,M = 1]
+ β2
N∏
i=1
P [xi|C = s,M = 2],
where β1 + β2 = 1, M the mixture component random variable. In princi-
ple, the class MAP rule can be invoked as before, evaluating for the spam case
log(αs) + log(P [x|s). However, in the spam case, due to the two components,
one no longer gets a sum of logs expression and numerical underflow practically
inviolates evaluation of log(P [x|s).
However, this can be mitigated without any approximation of the MAP deci-
sion rule, as follows. Note that
P [x|C = s,M = j] = P [M = j, C = s|x]P [x]
P [C = s,M = j]
, j = 1, 2.
Then, substituting this expression into
log(P [x|s]) = log(β1P [x|C = s,M = 1]
+ β2P [x|C = s,M = 2]),
we obtain
log(P [C = s,M = 1|x] + P [M = 2, C = s|x]) + log(P [x]).
Similarly, the MAP decision statistic under ham can be expressed as
log(P [C = h|x]) + log(P [x]).
The term log(P [x]) is common under the ham and spam expressions, and can be ig-
nored. Finally, we note that the posterior probabilities P [C = h|x], P [C = s,M =
1|x], and P [M = 2, C = s|x] are easily computed, and without numerical under-
flow problems. Thus, exact ham vs. spam MAP inference in the two-component
spam case is readily achieved.
2.4 EM Learning of the Spam Mixture
Maximum likelihood estimation of the two-component mixture can be performed
via a standard application of the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [17].
The model parameters are {β1, β2, {λl|C=s,M=1}, {λl|C=s,M=2}}, the {λ} the multi-
nomial word probabilities under the two components.
2Our approach can be extended to evaluate models with more than two components if there is
more than one attacker, a single but multi-modal attack, or if there is both attack and legitimate
class drift reflected in Xsc.
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E-Step:
Given the current model parameters3, one computes
P [M = j|x,C = s] =
βj
N∏
i=1
λxii|s,j∑
j′=1,2
βj′
N∏
i=1
λxii|s,j′
∀x ∈ Xsc.
M-Step:
The parameters are re-estimated via:
βj =
∑
x∈Xsc
P [M = j|x, s]
Ts + T˜s
, j = 1, 2 (1)
λi|s,j =
∑
x∈Xsc
xiP [M = j|x, s]∑
x∈Xsc
NxP [M = j|x, s] ,∀i (2)
where Nx is the number of words in the given document
4. The E and M steps
are alternated until a convergence criterion is met, with these iterations strictly
increasing in the log-likelihood of Xsc. The same EM algorithm applies in both the
training and retraining cases, except for one key difference – the model parameter
initialization, next discussed.
After model learning, the component whose emails are MAP-assigned with a
large percentage to the ham model (ham versus component model) is discarded.
This removes the attack component. The remaining component is a nearly ‘pure
spam’ component.
2.5 Spam Model Initialization
Crucial to our defense is the choice of initial model parameters, seeding the EM
learning.
Retraining Scenario:
In this case, since we have already learned the inaugural (single component) ham
and spam models, we can compute the ham posterior probability for x ∈ X˜s:
P [C = h|x] = αhP [x|C = h]
αhP [x|C = h] + αsP [x|C = s] ,∀x ∈ X˜s.
Since an attack introduces emails labeled as spam but with characteristics of ham,
we suggest to initialize the multinomial word probabilities as follows:
λl|M=2,C=s =
∑
x∈X˜s
xlP [C = h|x]∑
x∈X˜s
NxP [C = h|x] ,∀l (3)
3The first time the E-step is invoked, it uses the initialized model parameters.
4We slightly modify these updates, giving  = 10−6 additional counts to all words, to ensure
that all words have non-zero probabilities.
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λl|M=1,C=s =
count of word l in Xs
count of words in Xs ,∀l. (4)
Again,  counts are added to avoid zero probabilities. Here, component 1 is seeded
to be the true spam component, with component 2 seeded to capture the attack.
We initialize β1 = β2 = 0.5.
Training Scenario:
In this case, the learning of the two components is performed on the combined
data pool Xsc. The multinomial word probabilities are initialized as follows:
λl|M=1,C=s =
count of word l in Xsc
count of words in Xsc ,∀l (5)
λl|M=2,C=s =
count of word l in Xh
count of words in Xh ,∀l. (6)
Note that the “attack” component is initialized using the ham data. We realize
that the initial esitimation of λl|M=1,C=s is contaminated by the attack. However,
the subsequent EM algorithm is effective at “undoing” this contamination, i.e. at
reassigning the attack emails to component 2. Again, β1 = β2 = 0.5, is used for
initialization of EM.
3 Experimental Results
We used a subset of the TREC 2005 spam corpus [18], also used in [8]. The training
sets consisted of 8000 ham and 7977 spam emails. The (exclusive) test set consisted
of 2000 ham and 1994 spam emails. The dictionary (following stemming and
stoplisting) consisted of 19080 words. Attack emails were generated as follows: i)
the email length was randomly chosen to be the length of one of the spam training
emails; ii) Then the words were generated i.i.d. based on the NB ham model. We
also evaluated a second attack distribution which only used the words more likely
under ham than spam – this truncation of the dictionary (to 8645 words) makes
the attack more potent. The test set accuracy is evaluated for different attack
strengths varying from 0 to 105 attacking emails in each scenario.
Retraining Scenario:
For the retraining scenario, our method is compared with the standard NB
method for both attacks. As shown in Fig. 1, under the ‘pure-ham’ attack, the
test accuracy for the standard NB drops rapidly as the attack strength grows over
2× 104. Our method, however, keeps at a high test accuracy (around 0.9) for all
attack strengths. For the ‘truncated’ attack case where the attack is more potent,
the test accuracy of the standard NB drops even faster. Our method still performs
well, showing its robustness to variation in the attack strength.
In addition to the results shown in the figures, we also address two points. First,
we compared the BIC values between the single-component model and the two-
component model. As the number of attack emails (except zero) are tested, the
two-component model is always preferred, with a lower BIC. Second, the learned
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Figure 1: Retraining– test set accuracy with ‘pure-ham’ attacks.
mixture almost completely isolates the attack in the second NB component, and
the original spam component is essentially unchanged by the attacks. Especially,
none of the attacks are classified as true spam in the mixture in all cases for
‘truncated’ attacks above (except 104, for which one attack is misclassified as true
spam).
Training Scenario:
For the training scenario, the spam distribution is unknown a priori. Thus, the
‘truncated’ attack exploits knowledge that is unavailable even to the designer of
the classifier. Thus, we do not evaluate this attack in the training case, focusing on
the ‘pure-ham’ attack. Fig. 3 shows that our method has similar performance to
the standard NB for low attack strengths and beats the standard NB dramatically
when the attack strength is high.
4 Discussion
We have considered attacks which corrupt the spam data. Our approach could
also be applied if the attack targets ham, rather than spam. However, it is more
complicated to address an attack that simultaneously poisons both spam and
ham. That is a good subject for future work. Another scenario of interest is
where there is both an attack and legitimate “class drift”, e.g. a time-varying
distribution for spam. In such a case, one component may be needed to model
spam class drift, with another capturing the attack. It may be possible to identify
these two components because we would expect the attack distribution to be
closer to the ham distribution than legit drifting spam. Another good research
direction is to apply parsimonious mixture modeling [19] to learn accurate spam
7
Figure 2: Retraining– test set accuracy with ‘truncated’ attacks.
and attack components, working in the full word space. This approach is much
more computationally complex, but should also be a highly accurate spam model
“initialization” approach.
5 Conclusions
In this work, we proposed a mixture model based defense against data poisoning
attacks against spam filters, devising defenses against attacks on both classifier
re-training as well as against initial classifier training. Our approach should be
applicable more generally to defend against data poisoning attacks on other do-
mains that involve generative modeling of the data. Our mixture-based approach
could also be applied as a pre-processor, to remove attacks before they corrupt
(discriminative) training of a deep neural network or support vector machine based
classifier.
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Figure 3: Training– test set accuracy with ‘pure-ham’ attacks.
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